The book raises the notion that PGEs arise in situations where there’s a disequilibrium of knowledge about a risk. You describe how this can come about where there’s either too little knowledge about the risk, and so it’s too uncertain to insure, or conversely, where there’s too much knowledge of the risk and it may be becoming uninsurable through increased insurance premiums.
PJ: The book is intended for policy makers, and we set it up around what we call a paradox framework. We must recognise that insurance works within a sweet spot of balancing tensions. The premiums of the many pay for the losses of the few. That’s a paradox, because if we know where the losses will come from year after year, we wouldn’t include those properties in the insurance pool. Insurance only works if the losses are random and not deterministically known.
If a risk is known definitively, insurance won’t really work. Effectively, it’s possible to have too much knowledge about the risk to make it affordable in terms of pricing. So, what’s happening in many markets is that high risk areas are being priced out of the market. The follow-on impact is that the collective insurance risk pool is less diversified, reduced in size and potentially unsustainable. It’s an unintended consequence. This challenges the traditional construct of insurance.
Given the increasing impact of climate risk on weather perils, how do you see the future of time-bound PGEs, whereby the risk pool aims to be transitioned back to the private sector at a point in the future when it’s deemed more sustainable?
PJ: Protection pools that have been all-encompassing in terms of their scope of perils (e.g. Spain’s Concorcio4) tend to be more successful in evolving than those that have a narrow focus. Those that are set up around a highly specific risk can often struggle to evolve at the rate the climate is changing. So, if a pool covers cyclone as windstorm only, it wouldn’t protect people from the associated flood that might arise from the windstorm (or vice versa).
It’s also to do with the integration of insurance and resilience (Chapter 5 in Disaster Insurance Reimagined5). If you only subsidise a pricing problem to keep insurance affordable and don’t address the underlying risk, then the risk won’t improve, and in all likelihood will get worse. It’s because the vulnerability isn’t improving. The NFIP (National Insurance Flood Program) has struggled with this issue. With PGEs that seek transition back to the insurance market, they can only do this by ultimately lowering the risk. If the risk remains high, there’ll always need to be a PGE. So, transitioning risk is dependent on increasing resilience and/or lowering the risk.
Antoine Bavandi: PGEs also have to be considered in the context of the broader disaster risk management agenda. And there’s a distinction between disaster risk reduction and risk financing practices. Historically, developing countries have traditionally focused their efforts on risk reduction, with governments and development partners aiming to reduce their actual exposure to the risk. Of course, at a national level this is extremely difficult (given the enormity of the exposure), so they have tended to focus their efforts on the risk financing of very specific populations (e.g., emergency relief for the poor and most vulnerable) or critical exposures or services (e.g., infrastructural assets). I think today that focus is slowly shifting to a more holistic approach which combines risk reduction and risk financing, and considers all potential sources of socio-economic and financial vulnerability together. And the role of PGEs there is fundamental, not only as risk bearing mechanisms but also as a risk management platform in the broader sense.
Around 70% of global natural catastrophe losses are uninsured. Are some natural perils proving more challenging to closing that protection gap than others?
AB: The rising impact of what we term secondary perils is important to mention. While these perils (such as flood, wildfire, severe convective storm and drought) are not always modelled, they have accounted for up to 50% of total economic losses lately. There’s also difficulty in pricing these perils and sometimes a limited market appetite. Flooding is an obvious one to talk about, but also, wildfire and drought, which are growing concerns.
For developing countries, the focus has tended to be on supporting emergency relief payments (e.g. a smaller payment focused on immediate help in the aftermath of a disaster, rather than insuring the total rebuild costs). Many of these schemes in recent years have been exposed to global Property Cat market cycles, whilst trying to expand to meet the demand and driven by increased awareness of the value of insurance as well as by institutional donors’ support.
PJ: I totally agree on the impact of secondary perils. Added to this is the way some climate perils are compounding and exacerbating risk to PGEs. Increased heat, for example, has compounding impacts on both drought and wildfire risk. Another example from researching the multi-sovereign risk pools (e.g. the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF)) was the notable impact from excess rainfall on tropical cyclones losses. So while the risk product was covering the wind component, the damage was often coming from the secondary or associated rainfall peril, which is becoming more intense due to climate change.